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Abstract
This study will focus on the American Expeditionary
Force, North Russia from September 4, 1918 to August 5,
1919.,~5Balitionwarfare under U.N. command has become a
I
topic in recent years. The success of U.N. military
operations inrthe Gulf War and Somalia have brought forth a
ca11 for a multinational peacekeeping U~N. force to be
created and to be used to enforce U.N. resolutions. This
mul tinational force would be composed of member- IlatTon- ---
troops in mixed units and commands under control of the U.N.
~
What dangers can thi~ pose to United States foreign pol~cy
and the American military? In modern times U.S. Army troops
have only once been placed under fore'ign command at the
tactical level. This was in the North Russia interventioD
during the Russian Civil War. Before the' U.S. commits to
this policy of an integrated U.N. military force, our
government should examine in detail the events that occurred
in this intervention.
The Ame~ican Expeditionary Force consisted of the 339th
Inf'antryRegiment, 'lst"Battalion of the 310th Engineers,
1
·337th Field Hospital, and the 337th Ambulance Company, which
were elements of the 85th Infantry Division. The total
American force was 143 officers -and 4,334 enlisted men under
the command of Lt. Colonel George E. stewart.
The intervention in Northern Russia not only consisted
of an American element, but also had large numbers of
British, Canadian, and French troops. These foreign troops
in Russia were also supported by White (anti-Bolshevik
Russian) forces. The overall command of the forces in
Northern Russia was held by the British commander Major
General F.C. Poole and then by Major General Edmund
Ironside. The British not only held overall command of the
intervention; British officers and noncommissioned officers
exercised also local command over all Allied troops. This
tactical command held by the British led' to friction between
the Allied units in Northern Russii. This thesis will
examine the friction British command created and some of the
~
............... '6th~r problems -faced by the Allies in the Northern Russian
campaign. Host{lity came from different military, social
and cultural practices of the British aQd Am.erican allies.
2
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Also the lack of a clear reason to keep the American
soldiers in Northe·rn Russia after the armistice had been
signed led to great discontent in all Allied ~nits serving
in Northern Russia. The discontent eventually involved
every contingent of foreign soldiers, even in the American
units, and in anti-Bolshevik Russian units fighting in the
,,--.- .'
intervention in the north. U.S. policy as stated by
Wilson's aide-memoire required that American-forces were
only to be used to guard Allied supplies in North Russia,
but ended up fighting against the Bolsheviks in the Russian
Civil War. The discontent showed by the American soldiers
and officers can be directly linked to these reasons ..
-t'-·
3
.(
The relationship between the United states and the
United Nations has changed drastically over the past
several years. The role of the U.N. has taken ona
considerably larger part in U.s. foreign policy planning
than in the pdst. The United States rarely consulted the
U.N. when conducting military actions throughout the world.
More recently, the U.s. has chos€n to use the U.N. to build
coalitions for'peacekeeping actions. These actions can be
seen in the U.s. military conduct in the Gulf War (1991) and
the intervention in Somalia (1992-94). United states
foreign policy is by no means inextricably tied to U.N.
missions; but in the future America will be called upon
increasingly to become an active participant in U.N.
operations partly outside the scope of U.s. foreign policy.
A major American concern with regard to involvement in
U.N. peacekeeping or military engagements is the question of
putting U.s. troops under foreign command. The debate over
this issue continues ..' 'rhe.g;r;esent Administration sees the
United Nations becoming more active in the world's hot
spots. ·The U.s. Department of St~te's International Legal
4
-_J
IMaterials(1994) sees the role of the U. N. as: "no longer
limited to the interposition of small numbers of passive,
unarmed observers. Today, they also include more complex
and sometimes more robust uses of military resources to
-achieve a range of political and humanitarian obJectives."l
The Department of State's International Legal Materials
'.
also sets the government's policy of command. of U.S. troops
during United Nations military operations. It assures that
the President will always have overall command of American
troops in any U. N. operation and that U.S. commanders will
always answer directly to the President:~~ This does not
exclude the possibility of foretgn commanders controlling U.
S. troops. The issue of foreign command is stated as,
"sometimes prudent or advantageous (for reasons such as
maximizing military effectiveness and ensuring unity of
command) to place U. S. forces under the operational control
of a foreign commander to achieve specified military
,- ,~ .......... ",..•.. _, ...... ,.,. ~.:"- ..... ~
objectives."3 Command of U.S. troops under foreign offucers
"-
which can be--defined- in a broad terms .-Th"epol.icystatement-
...
is defined by the Department of State as operational control
. I
I
5
does not prohibit U. S. ?oldiers being commanded by foreign
officers and noncommissioned officers but does allow U. S.
officers and troops ultimate say in the operation and the
ability to pullout of U. N. operations at any time. 4
The United States has a long history of joining with
other governments in military conflicts, dating from early
Republic through World War One, World War' Two, Kor~a,
Vietnam, and more recently the Gulf War and Somalia. All
these conflicts saw U.S. troops commanded by U.S. officers
and not under the direct command of foreign officers. It is
true that during some of these'wars American troops were
directed strategically by foreign o£ficers; but they were
never tactically led by foreign officers.
Towards the end of World War One, Allied forces sent
troops to intervene in Russia. America sent contingents as
part of the Allied forces to Northern Russia (1918-1919) and
to Siberia (1918-1920). The American intervention in
tactical level, which allowed British officers to have
command over,American officers on the field of battle. The
6
Siberian 'intervention differed in that the Allies commanded
their own troops and no one ally had command over the
other's troops. Future conflicts could see U.S. troops
~I
placed once again under foreign command.
For some time, many people in the United States (aQ¢ in
A- ,
other nations) have called for a more eff~cti~e United
..
Nations. One way this could be achieved, according to these
appeals, is by integrating U.S. troops in a multinational
military force. This would involve U.S. soldiers and ~
officers serving in non-U.S. units, almost certainly placing
American servicemen and women under foreign office~.
Before the United States allows or commits to this policy,
an ~xample when U.S. forces have been directly under foreign
command at a tactical level of warfare should be closely
examined. During the Allied intervention in Northern Russia
(1918-19) American forces were placed under British
commanders, whose authority superseded that of their U. S.
. i
American -expeditionary jorce in Northern Russia subsequently
" complain~~ of be~ng placed under the British officers. s
7
- , '
)
This study will examine the experience of coalition
warfare in Northern Russia between American troops and their
British allies and superiors. This ~ill be accomplished by
looking at the relationship between the two nationalities in
the command hierarchy. During the intervention, and after,
many of the enlisted men and officers from the American '
339th Infantry Battalion complained of abuses by British
officers and noncommissioned officers. The Americans felt
these abuses to be so important that they hampered
Anglo-American relations during the, intervention in Northe'rn
Russia. How many of these affronts were actually the, fault
of the British? Were the abuses caused by the American lack
of experience in European conflicts and professionalism in
military matters? Who was doing the complaining in the
American ranks? Was this discontent universally held by the
American soldiers, or only by a few? Could the discontent
with the British be traced to one particular company or to
one front held by,~Arnerican forces? Thgse qUestions w~11" be
addressed in this study.
The backgroundto,theAmeri(j::an,j,Dterven,tion in Northern-
8
Russia forms an important part of this study. Why did the
American government believe it necessary to send troops into
Russia? Why did the intervention fail to fulfill its
objectives? Can the causes of these failures be traced to
the diversity of the troops who fought in Northern Russia,
and to the command structure used by the Allies?
In 1917 the First World War was in its third year. To
the major belligerents it seemed that the war was at a
stalemate. 6 Two events would change the course of the war.
These events were the American intervention in the war and
the Bolshevik Revolution, the latter of which took Russia
out of the conflict. The Bolshevik Revolution would bring;
the U.S. into the Russian Civil War in Northern Russia and
Siberia from 1918 to 1920. 7 The American intervention in
Siberia is well known because of the size of the forces sent
there, while the Northern Russian intervention seems to have
been forgotten by the American public and even by many
- .historians._.
By March 1917, after ,the last major Tsarist offensive
(ca,lled:the--Brusilov Offensive, June 1916) on the Eastern
9
Front, it was clear that Russia was heading for even greater
turmoil. The Tsarist government collapsed when the Russian
peasantry began to refuse its paper money. The winter of
1917 was particularly severe which led to a breakdown of the
Russian transportation system already strained from the war.
The peasants unable due to conditions inside Russia or just
refused to send their food to the towns, which in turn
caused food riots and added to the turmoil of the country.
In Petrograd, troops were sent to quell a series o~ riots
throughout the city. The troops refused to fire on the
rioters, so that the Tsarist authorities were unable to
regain control of the situation. In fact the Petrograd
garrison of 120,000 rural conscripts refused to obey the
Tsarist authorities and joined the rioters. 8 While this
revolt was occurring in Petrograd the rest of the country
-- ,_.~
was relatively quiet except for some sympathy strikes in
,
Moscow. It was only when the state machinery collapsed that
the revolt became a revolution. 9 Nicholas II was forced to
abdicate, and liberal poli~icians quickly formed ~>
parliarq.en..ta.r:y.~,governmentbased in the Duma. Workers'
-:-::---_._._----- ....-.__... _._-.-
10
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-~-.:-_::: --,~,,,-
councils formed in the factories and the army saw the
formation of soldiers' councils. The Bolsheviks used these
organizations to gain influence and then proceeded to use
them to take over the government during the November
Revolution in 1917. First Prince Lvov's government and then
the Kerensky government assured the French and British that
Russia would continue its war effort. Russia was unable to
keep this pledge to the Allies. As the country was
collapsing into anarchy, its soldiers increasingly refused
to fight. 10
At this point the Germans allowed Lenin to travel from
Swi tzerland to Russi,a. The Germans hoped that Lenin would
add to the turmoil that was spreading in Russia. l1 Lenin
slowly established his control over the Petrograd soviets
aBd advanced his party's agenda. Lenin at first found
himself rejected by many for his calls for peace; however as
the war continued, his message began to be heard. He called
for :p~ac::~ ,a,t any price, land reform, and bread, for the
people. These demands won support among the masses of
11
weary'and hungry. In November 1917, Kerensky's government
was overthrown by the Bolsheviks In a carefully planned and
executed armed insurrection. It is called the October
Revolution due to the Russian calendar which is eleven days
behind the Western one. The triu~phant Bolshevik Party
immediately started to carry out reforms by redistributing
landed property and eliminating private business in those
areas of R~ssia under its control.
The Bolsheviks controlled Petrograd and Moscow as a
result of their coup against Kerensky's government and had
been able to gain control of several of the cities either on
their own, without direction from,Lenin, or with the help of
other elements (local soviets, Mensheviks, and
Socialist-Revolutionaries) which wanted to overthrow the
Provisional Government. While the Bolsheviks assumed power
they still faced resistance from anti-Bolshevik (White)
elements who were marshaling their forces for the coming
civil war.]]
At first the Bolsheviks tried to continue the war out
.,I .
found that this was impossible if they were to ret~ir~ P?w.e~,
12
/'
(
Lenin sued for peace and at the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk
(March 1918), Soviet Russia had to give up huge amounts of
territory to the Germans and Austo-Hungarians. 14
This, treaty allowed the Germans to transfer forty
divisions from the East to the West, threatening the
Allies .15 The Western Powers realized that t/he-Bolsheviks
were not going to continue the war. They could not
understand that Lenin was not only unwilling, but also
unable to continue the war; the country could no longer
sustain the war effort. The Allies felt betrayed by the new
Soviet government and feared its new Communist ideology.
~ What did the Allied leaders see as their options in
dealing with Russia? With the failure of the last Central
Power's offensive in the summer of 1918, the Allies
anticipated the end of the war and were concerned about the
consequent state of affairs in Eastern Europe. The British
'--J
and French had different ideas on how to prevent future
~rman aggression in Europe. The two Allies saw that
Eastern Europe was the key to preserving peace on the
_ Con:·Unent. ~Rus-sia_and_ the. l)ew countries formed in Eastern
.-._-,.-.>.. - --'---._--- .." --.."'; ...... -.---'--"--"--' ., ..--.,..:.;...... , ../ ....
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Europe were now to play a key role in checking future German
aggression. Both countries agreed that the present
Bolshevik government had to be overthrown and any new
Communist,regimes in Eastern Europe eliminated. Britain and
France differed, however, on how to achieve this goal.
Premier Georges Clemenceau, the "Tiger" of France, saw.
Eastern' Europe as ft bulwark against a revival of German
'power. The emerging states of Poland and Rom~nia were the
key to blocking renewed German aggression. Viewing Russia
"t as important in checking Germany, Clemenceau believed the
Bolsheviks to be an equal danger to European security. The
armistice between the Allies and the Central Powers caused
new problems for French foreign pollcy in Europe.
Clemenceau became alarmed at the withdrawal of German troops
from Russia not because the Germans were leaving slowly, but
because they represented the only force preventing the
Bolsheviks from seizing the territories Germany had occupied
.
after Brest-Litvosk. ,-- France had- troops- in Russia-,beforethe'~
armistice, particularly in Northern Russia. However, the
French"sai:J NorthernRu,~siaas a secondapl. c.oncern in their
14
strategy for Eastern Europe .16
Believing that France did not have the resources to be
.-
everywhere in Russia and Eastern Europe, Clemenceau thought
that America and other countries such as Poland, Greece,
Romania, as well as "White" forces (composed of monarchists,
non-Russian nationalities, army officers, and other
anti-Bolshevik elements) and Ukrainian nationalists should
supply the manpower to defeat the Bolsheviks. France and
Britain expected the formation of large contingents of White
forces inside Russia to supply the principal manpower
reserves to defeat the Bolsheviks. Clemenceau wanted
America to fund the expeditions to invade Russia. The
French, in turn, would concentrate the struggle in Southern
Russia. With an Eastern Army at Salonika, which was used to
intervene in Southern Russia, France also supported General
Denikin, who led the White forces in the Don area and lent
favorable view to intervention in the south. The French
fqund willingallies~in·the~outhbesidesGenera~Denikin
and his anti-Bolshevik forces, to whom they had given loans
15
l
Ukrainian nationalists in Central and Southern Europe.
These peoples aspired to nationhood and the removal of
"-
German and Russian influence from their countries. They
also anticipated territorial gains at the expense of Russia
and looked to the Allies for assistance. The Central
Powers' defeat released these nationalities to pursue their
aspirations,' but created new dangers of occupation. The new
threat carne from the Bolsheviks, who wanted to regain
Russia's old borders and export Communist ideology. It was
'.
easy for the ethnic nationalities and emerging countries of
Eastern Europe to equate Bolshevism with Tsarist
imperialism. Thus France found willing allies in the ethnic
minorities of Russia and in the countries on Russia's
.~borders, espec.lally Poland and Romania which hoped to secure
Russian territory.17
Clemenceau's policy on Russia limited France's
commitment of 'armed forces; but France cl~arly was prepared
to support the anti-Bols~evik forces. Clemenceau wanted a
restored conservative Russia as a counterweight to Germany.
However, he- agr--eed t~at ,EGland and.::Bpmq,nia I!light,play:that
16
role. ls
Backed by the center and right in the French Chamber
of Deputies, Clemenceau encountered opposition from the
Socialists, who opposed intervention in Russia. Determined
to eliminate Bolshevism, which he viewed as a profound
threat to European peace, the French Premier sent troops to
occupy areas of Russia, to aid anti-Boshevik forces, and to
support French troops in Nort~ern Russia.!9
Prime. Minister Lloyd George of Britain followed a
policy similar to that of Clemenceau in that he did not want
to commit substantial numbers of troops in a campaign
against Bolshevism. The British perceived Communism as a
o
far greater threat to Europe than the shattered power of
Imperial Germany. Lloyd George also sent troops to Northern
Russia (Murmansk on March 6th, 1918 and Archangel on August
6th, 1918) before the armistice to stop German advances in
Russia. Now, in late 1918, Britain was sending troops to
Russia to protect British interests there and to prevent
recovery -of 'Russlantefritory by_ the Bolsheviks .co
17
revived conservative Russia within its former borders.
Britain ha9 long tried to check Russian imperial expansion
in the Middle East and in Central Asia. The
re-establishment of a conservative regime in Russia would
revive this rivalry between the two powers. Lloyd George
favored a smaller, less po~erful Russia, but did not want to
see Russia totally dismembered. For this reason, the
British supported separatist movements in Siberia, the
Baltic, Finland, the Caucasian region, and Northern Russia.
These .independent states would check both German and Rus$ian
expansion in the future. The British found, as did the
French, that ethnic minorities were willing to fight
Bolshevism. 21
Both the British and the French looked to Poland and
Romania as bulwarks against a future German revival and to
hinder the spread of Bolshevism. Britain envisioned a chain
of states surrounding Bolshevik Russia, which would contain
-
and eventually smother the Communists, eventually returning
\
Russia-to demoerac.y . The British saw this ring of hostile
~- - :....... -
sta.tes as a cordon sanitaire which wQuldallow.Britain and
18
France to avoid heavy involvement in Russia's irtternal and
external struggles. Lloyd George viewed Britain's role to
monetar aid and equipment to these
7 states, but limited in the use of British armed forces. He
expected American and British Dominion troops to supply the
manpower to defend these new states. 22
The Allies' fear of Bolshevism was shown by the British
interest in the Baltic, especially the three nations of
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Lloyd George saw these
Baltic countries as essential buffer states for the cordon
sanitaire against Communism. Britain did not have
sufficient manpower to garrison these states. But with the
armistice in November 1918, t0e British found a willing ally
against Bolshevism in the Germans. Under Article XII, the
Allies wanted German troops to remain in the East until the
Allies decided these troops could return to Germany. The
Allies perceived the danger of a power vacuum if the Germans
withdrew from the occupied territories in the East. They
did not want Leni~ and the Bolsheviks to gain control in
these areas . -The AI-lies told the Germans- -t,o hold these- •. ,
19
territories; but the Germans continued to withdraw their
troops from the East. These troops were needed in Germany.
Germany faced threats from the Spartacists, the left in
labor movement, from separatist movements in Bavaria, and
from foreign occupation of German territory.23
One area in which the Germans were willing to
intervene, when the British pressed them, was in the Baltic.
The Germans had been interested in this area since the
Middle Ages, and a large ethnic German element lived there.
With the fall of th§ Latvian capital Riga to the Bolsheviks
on January 3, 1919 and the Lithuanian city of Vilna two days
later, the British looked to the Germans to supply the
manpower to retrieve the situation. The Free Corps,
formations of German "volunteers" or "irregulars," provided
the manpower to stop Bolshevik advances. With the support
of the British navy, the Free Corps recaptured Riga in May
1919 but alarmed the British when they overthrew the na~ive
government of Latvia and-started t<:l act independently. The
Free Corps' achieved their high water mark with the
.. , -recapture of Riga . Pressure from British on the Germans, as -
20
. /"
well as resistance by Latvians who refused to be ruled by
Germans, then forced the Free ~orps to return to Germany.
Intervention by the Free Corps in Latvia demonstrates the
willingness of the Allies to use any means to stop the
spread of Bolshevism in Eastern Europe, even if this policy
required use of Gennan troops."4
Lloyd George faced opposition from the right and left
on his policy for Russia. On the right, the
from Winston Churchill and others who wanted
opposition came
a full scale /
21
intervention against the Bolsheviks: Lloyd George opposed
this idea because he recalled Britain's intervention early
in the French Revolution, which had led into the long
sequence of the Napoleonic Wars. He saw the Bolshevik
Revolu~ion as equivalent to the period of the Terror during
the French Re~lution. He believed that Allied intervention
would provoke a new round of wars in Europe if the Allies
intervened directly in Russia; hence he concluded that the
best course would_ge to allow the Bolshevik Terror to
destroy itself. Further, he believed President Woodrow
W.ilson was not_willi.ngt7in.t~_r:'ZeDe. .i.n__ R_~~~~~_~~:.~~._:~.~~:~~ .._;~_ ... _
.,_.""'-'!r":>O'"--- _", ..._-.-:'-_""'f'.;' ~ ... ---
~ .-~._.:.. __•.-..._~.-~_~.. -,~..,.,; ,:,~c~';;--"-
the American President abhorred Bolshevism. Lloyd George
could not expect full American support for a British crusade
in Russla. of cordon
n
sanitaire against Russia, despite strong Conservative
demands for full intervention. 25
The British Left had all but disappeared during this
period. Both the Liberal and Labor Parties had been
silenced by the "Khaki Election," where right-wing
conservatives gained control of the House of Commons. The
.;..~".~-~- -
"Khaki Election" of 1919 certainly influenced Lloyd George's
policy on Russia, this new Parliament was pushing towards
greater intervention, or at a minimum to the continued
~--presence of British troops in Russia. While Lloyd George was
not convinced this policy was in the best interest of
Britain, pressure from the right made recalling British
troops in Russia more difficult for him. Opposition to
British intervention in Russia came from the Labor Party,
which advocated a rapid withdrawal of British troops, short
of causing a military disaster. The Laborites wanted Lloyd
,
--=--'George to eXjJli"rinBri tain's- policy towards"Russia-more--o
22
clearly and to end the intervention. 26
Even if Lloyd George had supported large-scale
intervention itself, the British government faced a problem
in the military.
who mutinied because they saw that the war was over, yet
were not being allowed to demobilize. This mutiny spread
through the embarkation polnts in Southern England, even
reaching the city of Calais on the Continent. The mutiny
was finally halted with a promise of a quick demobilizati~p
and by the use of other troops sent in to suppress more
radical elements among the mutineers. This mutiny sent a
message to Lloyd George about a full scale intervention in
Russia. Even hard line interventionists, such as Churchill,
recognized that the British people and soldiers would not
abide another crusade in Europe. 27
France and Britain's policies for intervention into
Russia differed greatly from the United States. •The two
European powers were tied to age old diplomatic maneuvering
in this part of Europe, whi~e America had really no
his.,torJc.q.l basis to, interfere in Eastern~l.lEqF~/,Ameri::a,·
,23
it could be argued, did have financial interests in the
region especially in Russia, but these were on the whole
minor. What then was American policy for Eastern Europe?
Woodrow Wilson is well know for his ideas on
self-determination and democracy and these two ideas
influenced American foreign policy in this area of Europe.
For example President Wilson supported the creation of
Poland and the split up of the Austrian Empire into
countries along ethnic lines. He also encouraged the
establishment of democracy in Eastern Europe and the Central
Powers. As for Russia, Wilson was against Allied
intervention into the affairs of the country based upon his
idea of self-determination. His expression on
self-determination can be seen not only in his aide-memoire28
on American troops being sent to North Russia and Siberia
but later also in the decision to intervene. 29
So why did President Wilson come to intervene in
.J
Russia? Several reasons can be found for his intervention
into Russia. Some of the reasons for intervention were in
_common withhlsAl1ies"B:fitairi',' and FranCe."
24
The Allies, particularly the British, had given massive
loans to the Tsarist government and then to the Kerensky
ar e 0
.3,850 million roubles, while its~~ were 3,436 million
roubles. 30 Russia's creditors were France, which held the
largest amount, then Great Britain and finally the United
states and Belgium. 31 Through the end of 1916, Russia cwed
6,681 million roubles in war debts to the Allies. 32 Russia's
revenues in 1916 were 4,154 million roubles. 33 France held
more of Russia's prewar debts but Britain proved the largest
creditor for Russian war loans, followed by France and the
United States. 34 Now Lenin and his Communist colleagues had
disavowed repayment of these debts. 3s
The Allies' feeling of betrayal because of the
Bolshevik refusal to repay war loans, together with the
Soviet regime's unwillingness to continue the war against /
Imperial Germany after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March
1918), helped to prompt the Allied intervention in Russia.
The Allies came to believe that the Bolsheviks were directly
allied with the Germans. During the Allied"intervention in
25
Northern Russia, many in the Allied high command were
convinced that the Communist forces were fighting under .
German leadership. Even after the Germans had surrendered,
Allied leaders believed that the Communists were using
German and Austrian prisoners to train their troops.Jl
The substantial amounts of war materials stockpiled in
Russia during the war was a major reason for Allied
intervention in Northern Russia. Due to the Central Power's
advance into Russia, the Allies had been forced to supply
the Russians through the ports in the North. The cities of
Murmansk and Archangel were the principal depots for Allied
war aid. President Wilson's main purpose of his
aide-memoire was in sending American troops into Northern
Russia was to prevent the Germans from capturing these
supplies. He wanted American troops to defend these
stockpiles. 'Ii
During the war, the Russians captured almost 60,000
Czech and Slovak soldiers who had been drafted to fight on
the Eastern Front for the Austro-Hungarian Empire.'· These
troops had little loyalty to the Dual Monarchy, which _tbey, __.
26
1-
believed held their nation captive; many of them became
willing to fight for Russia on the Eastern Front. The
Provisional Government organized the Czech-Slovak prisoners
eglon, en saw action on the Eastern
Front against the Central Powers. When the October
Revolution overthrew the Kerensky government, followed by
peace with the Germans, the Czech Legion of about 24,000
found itself fighting in isolation. 40 The Czech soldiers
decided to evacuate to the east, by which they hoped to be
able to return to the fighting o~ the Western Front. At
f~rst the Bolsheviks and the Czech Legion got along with
each other and the latter even encouraged the move out of
Russia. But when the Bolsheviks signed the Brest-Litovsk
treaty relations cooled. While traveling through Siberia to
Vladivostok the Czech Legion had an altercation with
repatriated Hungarian prisoners of war. Under pressure from
the Germans to detain the Czech Legion, the Soviet
government saw this episode as a reason to do so. Leon
Trotsky unabl~ to detain the Czech Legion because of the
27
enabled the the Czechs to take over several key cities along
the Trans-Siberian Railroad. The Czech Legion found itself
in the middle of the Russian Civil War and at war with the
Bolsheviks. 41
The Western press took great interest in the Czech
Legion's effort to leave Russia, which also helped to bring
Allied intervention in Russia. The Czech Legion provided a
strong incentive for President Wilson in involving American
troops in both Northern Russia and Siberia. 4c This was
clearly pointed out in Wilson's aide-memoire as a major
reason for sending troops to Russia. The rescue or
evacuation of the Czech Legion served as a central point in
Allied pl~nning in .Northern Russia. 4J
Fear of German occupation of European Russia, the
reparation of war debts, the evacuation of the Czech Legjon,
and the security of Allied war material in Northern Russia
persuaded Wilson to commit American troops in the summer of
1918. The ~read of Communism also played a major role in
bringing American troops into Russia, for by this time fear
of the central powers".oveYr1lnnii1g European "Russia had
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receded. The Russian Civil War was still seen as an open
contest between the Bolsheviks (Reds) and Anti-Bolsheviks
.,.r;..
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with competing aims. Wilson assumed American troops in
Russia would not become combatants in the Civil War, and
29
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anti-Communist forces .. Wilson erred in believing that the
presence of American troops in Russia would not affect the
outcome of the Civil War, even if these forces did n9t take
a
President Wilson found these reasons for intervention
in Northern Russia sufficient for America to send troops to
Archangel and Murmansk. He still held reservations about
sending American troops to Siberia which he saw as a
separate policy decision from sending troops to Northern
Russia. 44 Secretary of State Robert Lansing in a letter to
Woodrow Wilson stated: "I told him [Lord Reading] that
I,'"
interv~rition at Murmansk and Archangel would receive far
more favorable consideration on our part than intervention
"-..
in Siberia."45 A Japanese presence in Vladivostok was not
welcome to the American Government, as this represented an
extension of Japan's power in the area, much like the
seizure of Germany's Pacific colonies.during the war.
Wilson was willing to send troops for other reasons, as well
as opening a way for the Czech Legion's retreat, and his
fears;, based on rumors, that the Bolsheviks would ma:ssacre .
~ .- ....~. _...
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the civilians of Vladivostok.
Wilson and his advisors questioned the value of
diverting American troops from the France to Siberia and to
thern Russia. He al.5o quesUoI1ed dlvertlng U.S. trooFls
to Northern Russia but believed if General Foch, head of the
Allied command in France, gave his consent it would not draw
off forces from the Western Front. 46 General Foch cons~nted
to sending 2 to 3 battalions of American troops with support
troops of engineers and service troops to Northern Russia
assuring Wislon that it would not hamper operations on the
Western Front. 47 Wilson'then duly authorized the request
from the Allied Supreme War Council for troops to be sent to
Northern Russia in the amount of three battalions of the
339th Infantry Regiment, a battalion from the 310th
Engineers, 337th Field Hospital and the 337th Ambulance
• Company, for a total force of about 5, 000 troops. 48
Wilson received strong support for intervention in
Northern Russia from the American ambassador, David R.
-1
Francis, who served in this position from March 9th, 1916 to
'April 2EithX9~~L.~r:anc.ts. was the senior: Allied a1Ilbassado:):'
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to Russia and would be the last U.S. ambassador until 1933.
Francis was anti-Communist in outlook and believed that the
not see
any problem in encouraging this collapse by using American
troops. Francis pushed actively for American intervention.
Francis's anti-Bolshevism is expressed in his 1921
autobiography entitled Russia From the American Embassy. He
wrote in his book: "I advoc~ted the eradication of
Bolshevism in Russia because it is a blot on the
civilization of the Twentieth Century, and for the
additional reason that it is to our interest to exterminate
it in the land of its birth. "49
In contrast, Francis' subordinate Felix Cole warned
against intervention. A letter Cole sent to Secretary of
State Robert Lansing reveals his anticipation of the
problems intervention could cause. Cole wrote: "Every
foreign invasion that has gone deep into Russia has been
swallowed up ... If we intervene, going farther into Russia
as we succeed, we shall be swallowed up. "so
~ Despite such warn·ingsF Wilson' decided to- intervene in
32
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Northern Russia, but set down guidelines for the use of
American troops. His aide-memoire set down the rules of how
the U.S. troops were to be nS€d in R~~. The aide-memoire
states: "Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and
Archangel, the only legitimate object for which American or
Allied troops can be employed, is to guard military stores
which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces, and to
render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the
organization of their own self-defense."5! Wilson's
aide-memoire was violated immediately by U.S. troops, who
were active from the star-t in fighting Bolshevik forces in
Northern Russia. ',c
The turning point of the American intervention in
Russia carne in the Battle of Shenkursk, in the winter of
1918-19. This battle, although not of great military
significance, did change Allied policy in Russia and brought
an end to Allied advances in Northern Russia.
The British were the first to land at Murmansk in March
1918. They were dispatched to protect the port when it was
believed that the Germans would capture the city and use it
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as a submarine base in their naval campaign against Britain.
But the British had more than protection of the port in
mind, for they ~anted to reconstitute the Eastern Front
against Germany, and .to check the expansion of the Bolshevik
power. The British envisioned massive recruiting of a large
anti-Bolshevik army, to be supplied and trained by Allied
..
forces serving in North Russia.
The British not only occupied Murmansk, but also sent
troops to the Caucasus in Southern Russia. The French,
however, provided the largest number,of troops for
occupation in the south. France's Eastern Army took several
"
key strategic areas on the Black Sea, including Odessa, the
Crimea, and their surrounding areas, thus preventing the
'"
Bolshevik~ from gaining control after the Germans pullej out
their forces. The Allied navies entered, then took control
of the Black Sea, to prevent the Bolsheviks from gaining
influence and to support White forces in the area.
During-·the war, -Apehan<3el -ha-d'0ecome-a major Russia
depot for Allied supplies. When the Bolsheviks took power,
~
Archangel became a majo.r scmfce--:""f"oi:-- Bolshevik -forc~~
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fighting against the Whites. The Allies realized that the
Communists were using these supplies and decided to remove
the local Bolshevik government. The Allies wanted to occupy
the port city of Archangel, where most of the war material
was held. Archangel had a population of about fifty
thousand people, while Northern Russia had about half a
million people in total. Thus the Allies hoped to use the
port as a base to push into the interior city of Vologda,
some five hundred miles away. Vologda straddled the
northern branch of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, the only
link to Central Siberia and the Pacific Ocean."]
General Poole, the British commander who landed at
Archangel, decided to push inland to capture the area beyond
the city. Local Bolshevik forces defending Archangel pulled
~
b?ck when the Allied attack began. The Bolsheviks continued
to retreat, skirmishing with the Allied forces along the
route to the interior. Poole's force of about 1,150 men
ddvanced along several fronts at once. This small British
force grew in size to nearly 6,000 men as more troops
arrivedfr'om EngI3n.d, The American forces serving in the
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area numbered just under 5,000 men. The major fronts
around Archangel were the Onega River, the Archangel-Vologda
Allied Forces on Archangel Fronts
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Railway, the Vaga River, and the Dvina River. This line
constituted a 500 mile front, which the Allies had to
defend. General Poole required additional troops to hold
the front and to fight his way deeper into Russia. 5;
The Allies f'aced Bolshevik forces in Northern Russ ia,
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primarily the 6th Independent Army under the command
Aleksandr A. Samoilo. The 6th Army was made up of the 18th
~--------------~~'f~lee-fD~i~,v~i~s~l~'o~n~whjcbwas divided into three infantry
Brigades. The first and second Brigades covered the Onega
front and Railway front and the third Brigade's fronts were
the Vaga, Dvina and Pinega. 55 The Bolshevik 6th Army had
about a total of 42,070 troops in the North Russian
theatre. 5G
While the Bolshevik forces outnumbered the Allies on
every front in Northern Russia, this was not a major
determinant in the outcome of the intervention. A closer
look at the Bolshevik forces in Northern Russia reveals that
while they enjoyed num~ricar superiority in manpower this
did not always mean victory. The First World War
demonstrated that technology favored the defensive and made
offensive operations costly. This applied to operations in
Russia, in that defense usually prevailed over offensive
operations, especially_during the winter months. 57
Bolshevik forces often found that they did not have
_adequatE;.,m9:Jert.?J _to _,suPPl.Y theirsoldier.s .'&h~:}~?ls~~ej~i~~
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under Leon Trotsky mobilized large armies from mass
conscription of peasants and working class populations of
the cities under their control. The workers from the cities-
came to the army because of their Bolshevik sympathies,
while the peasants came to the army to protect the land they
acquired during the Revolution. The Whites (anti-Bolshevik)
were not as successful in tapping these two sources of
manpower because of their reactionary polices and their
support for the return of landowners' property. While mass
conscription gave the Bolsheviks large armies, these armies
tended to be poorly equipped and trained. The Red Army also
lacked cohesion because of constant desertions by the
conscripts. The Bolshevik armies in most chases outnumbered
their opponents on the battlefi~t lacked trainin~,
experience, equipment and cohesion. 58
In 1918, the British had committed most of their forces
to holding the Western Front and had few reserves to send
~eneL~l Poole. The British Government looked to America for
the troops who would reinforce Poole. The 339th Infantry
-"'Regiment landed at' Archangel-on: 'Septenlber9th,"1918-. 'The
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(339th Regiment, part of the 85th Division stationed at Fort
Custer, had 4,487 men, mostly from the state of Michigan and
y e Clty of Detroit. The Regiment named
~
itself the Polar Bear Regiment because of the condi~ions
under which it fought. The Detroit newspapers dubbed the
339th Regiment "Detroit's Own. ,,5'J The men, mostly of Polish
and Russian descent, were sons of first or second generation
immigrants. Other American contingents who served in
Northern Russia were the 310th Engineers, the 337th Field
Hospital, and the 337th Ambulance Company. The total of
American troops serving in North Russia, including troops at
Murmansk, was to reach 5,710. The 339th was origin~lly to
serve in France, but was diverted to Archangel to reinforce
General Poole's army. The soldiers of the 339th had only
light training for combat. Their training was to have been
completed in France; training could not be accomplished in
Russia because the Regiment was committed to combat upon
arrival. 6o
Before leaving for Russia in September 1918, the
American soldiers' equipment was exchanged for Russian
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weapons and British winter clothing. Issuing Russian rifles
occurred because the Americans could use stockpiles of
ammunition already shipped to Russia by the Allies.
Allowing the Americans to keep their own rifles would have
led to additional supply problems for the Allies. This same
idea was used for the issuing of British winter gear to the
Americans which would helped to alleviate supply problems
for the Allies. American soldie~s disliked their new
equipment and frequently complained about it. The American
soldiers were equipped with the British Enfield (.30 Cal.)
rifle which was produced in America."" The Enfield had
proved particularly effective among American soldiers,during
WWI and was sadly missed by the 339th in Russia. Their
rifles were replaced with Russian ones produced in Britain. '
The American soldiers found that they could not use the
sights on their new rifles because the measurements were in
Russian versts. A verst equals 3,500 feet, an awkward
figure for American soldiers trying to make ~he conversion
when sighting their rifles. The result was poor
marksmanship in combat. Amer-ican soldiers took an inst3.ht
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dislike to their new rifles. 62
Lieutenant Charles B. Ryan of K Company, 339th Infantry
'-,--
Reglrrrem::: on tne UVlna r<-..i. veL
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October 3, 1918 what he thought of the equipment belng used
by the Allies: "That it is a typical British Expedition.
We have been up against everything modern trench mortars,
rifle grenades, airplanes, artillery, antiaircraft guns,
hand grenades ... We have our Russian rifles, only south a
couple of Lewis [machine] guns. We are not well equipped-as
were our so~rs in the Spanish War. Our two 3" guns
[pieces of artillery] are jokes. They are manned by
Russians and hurt us more than they help. "63
The commander of the 339th was Colonel George E.
Stewart, who was directly under General Poole's command.
The British had overall command of combat operations, and
British officers had rank over their American counterparts
in the field. During fighting British officers and even
norrcommisioned offierscGuld order American troops-into'
action. 6 ;
The question of command of the Allied forc~s jQ
41
Northern Russia in the words of Wilson's military advisor
and United states military representative on t~e Supreme War
Counci~ in Paris, General Tasker Howard Bliss: "The
..-...-:--~.oQ,.
question of command has proved a delicate one. 1165 The French
wanted.command on the ground in Northern Russia and
conceding control of the sea to the British. 66 The British
envisioned a single command for safety reasons. 67 They
argued that besides the safety in a single command that an
experienced general was needed. Since the British already
had one in Northern Russia, General Po?le, the British
should command the expedition. (,B
The British claim to command in Northern Russia was not
favorably recieved by Secretary of War Newton Diehl Baker.
The Secretary of War question British command of the
operation on two points. The first was that since the
United States was supplying so many troops why could not the
expedition be under American command. The second point,
that the intervention would be seen more favorable by the
Russian people if it were under American command and not by
a European one. He believed ,this because where as the
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British and French had ambitions in Russia, the Americans
did not. V)
General Bliss answered concerns brought forth by Baker.
Baker then passed them onto President Wilson. 70 Bliss stated
that the British demanded single command by a British
commander and he agreed on this issue. General Bliss saw
the_overall American commitment as a small one, while the
Allies would be supplying the larger amount to the
expedition. The French had accepted the idea of British
overall command in Northern Russia and Bliss believed for
expediency on the issue and safty of the operation, it
should have a single command under a the British General
Poole. 7 ]
, - ~n....... r-_·.~ ... "•. - __"_"-,'''''',r • .' . _, ~ ._', _\'
It is evident from Wilson' s.1a:rae'.!:'fueIiz'dir~on"···?
Northern Russia that the issue of command was conceed to the
British. The British were t~ave total command of the
operation Joth on the land and the sea. This was to lead to
British command at a tactical level over American troops.
General Poole immediately dispatched the 339th regiment
under Colonel Stewart toward the front lines. This was not
the first time American forces saw action in Northern
43
Russia. When Poole first landed at Archangel, American
warshi in the attack. The warship U.5.5 Olympia of
Manila Bay fame sent a contingent of marines ashore with
Poole's troops.- The marines raced dowh the
Archangel-Vologda railway on a steam locomotive equipped
with machine guns and pursued Bolshevik forces for until
they were stopped by a counter attack. The British
reinforced the marines, who were then sent back to the
U.5.5. Olympia. Later, after the main force of Americans
had arrived, the marines were sent down the
-....., .
Archangel-Vologda rallroad towards Vologda, where Americans
helped capture the town of Oberskaya. Here they were
stopped by lack of supplies and by-t-ough opposf"ttOh from"'the"
Bolsheviks. The Americans were also sent to the front on
the Vaga River. Earlier that autumn, General Poole, using
his British troops, had tried to force his way down the
river, only to be blocked by strong Bol~€¥ik resistance.
The Americans strengthened Poole's forces, so that he was
able to capture the important city of Shenkursk along with
the surrounding yillag~,s.,.,E\cel1:-wi.:th the ,addition of
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American troops, Poole's ambitious offensive ground to a
halt due to supply problems and exhaustion. The Allies were
forced to take up defensive POSl 7?
While Wilson's aide-memoire set the parumeters for
American interv~ntion in Northern Russia, it was so loosely
'v
worded and ambiguous as to allow a broad interpretation.
Colonel Stewart was not even briefed on Wilson's
aide-memoire, therefore he knew nothing of it and committed
his forces to his British superior's, General Poole,
offensives into Russia. Colonel Stewart did not receive the
aide-memoire until October 5, 1918,73 even though Ambassador
Francis had known of Wilson's aide-mem9ire of_Russi-aDo
intervention as far back as August. 74
With the halt of offensive operations, the ambitious
General Poole was replaced as British commander. Poole's
continual pressing for more troops, his high handedness in
dealing with the Archangel government of President Nikolai
·Vasi'l' evich Chaikovskii, and -his poor relations with his
allies compelled the British government to find a new
commander for Northern Russia.'s The British sent General
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Edmund Ironside to fill the position. Ironside differed in
strategy ftom Poole in that he was not willing to push along
all the fronts. He expected to wait until the sprin before-
resuming the offensive, enabling the troops to rest and
recuperate. 76
News from Europe that winter changed the overall
mission as the Allies had originally envisioned it. The
original assignment of the American troops had been to guard
military supplies in Northern Russia from German capture, to
link up with the Czech Legion in Siberia, and to
reconstitute the Eastern Front against Germany. In fact,
the Allied objective was to checlCtIfe·spFeaCi'()f Bolshevism
and, indeed, to overthrow the Soviet regime. The armistice
in November 1918, and the German surrender, called into
question the reasons why the Allies remained in North
Russia. The Allied soldiers began to question the purpose
of their campaign. Through the winter, Allied morale fell
as the men wished for an end to their tour. This discontent
would eventually express itself in mutinies among nearly all
" ".
the for"c"es serving" iri- North Russia, -- including the'Affie~ic:ans~
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The Allies had to deal not only with the growing
discontent among their soldiers, but also with increasingly
serlous attacks by the Bolsheviks. Throughout the winter,
the Bolsheviks attacked the Allies in their defensive
positions, although these engagements were largely minor.
The winter saw a battle at Shenkursk which represented the
farthest Allied advance into Northern Russia and would
decide the outcome of the intervention.
The battle of Shenkursk was made up of several smaller
engagements in the surrounding villages. -The city of
Shenkursk's population of -several thousand made it smaller
population center between the two cities. Shenkursk is
located on the Vaga River, 200 miles south of Archangel. 77
The city was captured by British units on September 25,
1915. 78 The capture of the city and the surrounding villages
marked the farthest advance south made by the Allies in
their intervention in Northern Russia. _Yar a variety of
reasons the Allies did not or could not go any further than
Shenkursk. During. the wi:nb:~f of r9TS"-19" "the Allies built up
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their defensive position at the city. Snow covered the
ground on October 20, 1918, which made large scale
transportation of troops and supplies more difficult for t e ..
Allies. 79 There was nothing for the Allies to do but await
reinforcements in the spring and political events from the
Allied capitals.
The Bolshevik planned their winter offensive to capture
or destroy the Allied garrison forces at Shenkursk. They
expected to achieve this by surrounding and cutting off of
the Allied tf90PS in the Shenkursk area. The attack was to
/'
be carried out by about 3,100 infantry of the Sixth
Samoilo. 80
The Allied strength around Shenkursk that winter was
about 1,700 men. 8 ! The Americans had two companies in the
area, the A and C company of the 339th Infantry Regiment. B2
The two American companies were not stationed in Shenkursk,
although PBLt.of C company was used to garrison the city. A
company's headquarters was at Vysokaya Gora, with an outpost
. at the'vil1a-ge of Nizhnya:ya-Gora~ twenty v'~rst (about
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fifteen miles) south of Shenkursk.
The Bolsheviks opened up their attack on Ust Padenga on
January 19, 1919 with a bombardment. Sergeant John S.
Crissman of1\ company, who was at Vysokaya Gora when the
attack upon Nizhnyaya Gora began, wrote on October 19, 1919:
"Enemy opened up artillery fire 6:30 AM and continued all
day. They attacked us from all sides. Our outpost at Ninji
[Nizhnyaya] Gora was fired upon at daybreak and shortly
after were surrounded and had to retreat."S3
On the 22nd of January the Bolshevikq attacked Vysokaya
Gora and forced the Allies to retreat again. Crissman wrote
on January 22, 1919 about the r~treat: "Shelling all day.
At I1PM tonight we got word that we were to retreat toward
Shenkursk." Upon arriving at Shenkursk on the 25th of
January Crissman wrote:" "About I1PM we were told to get
ready to leave, carrying nothing but overcoat, rations, gun,
and belt."B4
The British commander of .Shenkur-sk-,- -£-olonel Graham, had
been given permission by General Ironside to decide whether
he was to hold the city or to abandon it_ On Jahuary 24,
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1919, Colonel Graham wired his last message at 4:00 P.M.
that he was surrounded. Colonel Graham started the
evacuation of Shenkursk at 1:30 A.M. BS ~he Allies were able
o retreat from Shenkursk because the surrounding Bolshevik
troops had overlooked a winter trail, enabling the Allies to
escape and reach Kitsa, where they took up defensive
positions. The front line was to remain at Kitsa until the
Allied withdrawal from Russia. The Allies were able to
bring out 1,500 troops, along with 500 civilians sympathetic
to the Allies cause. B6
The battle of ShenkursJcwas unusual in that i.t
represented a set piece battle with relatively large forces
employed on each side. Other .large scale engagements
occurred at Toulgas and Bolshie Ozerki. The Allies and
Bolshevik armies usually fought each other in small scale
engagements involving squgds. It was really a war of
ambushing and patrolling by the two sides. The Allies were
not used to this kind of warfare. Their soldiers and
_~,.--" ..,,~ ._, ._".L,";..• -.., ......·_~,¥..:-'-_ ',~' _,", _ "'.~
officers were trained to fight large scale encounters at
brigaaeoc-regi:mentalleveL TEench warfare- was "an integral-
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part of the soldiers' and officers' training. The
Bolsheviks faced the same problems as the Allies in this
kind of warfare. The Allies had a well established military
doctrine for fighting a war during this period. In
contrast, Bolshevik armies adopted this kind of small scale
warfare more easily because of their lack of organization
and training. This warfare was best fought by irregular
forces.
The battle itself was small and of little strategi~
meaning to the overall Allied position in North Russia; but
it showed that the Bolsheviks were a force to be reckoned
Bolsheviks' ability to fight. After the Shenkursk retreat,
~ the Allies began to reevaluate their position. The battle
also exposed the strategic weakness of the Allied position
in North Russia. The Allies had failed to reestablish the
Eastern Front (rendered an irrelevancy by the end of war)
. ) .
and instead were now bogged down in North'~Russia agains t the
Bolsheviks. They had failed to link up with the Czech
'-
Legion, again because of Bolshevik resistance. While they
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had been able to keep the Bolsheviks from gaining additional
territory in the North, there was no indication the
Bolshevik regime would crumble under the Allie
The defeat at Shenkursk caused Wilson come to conclude
that AmeriCan troops had been used unwisely by the British
commanders in their attempts to push deeper into Russia.
Growing·criticism by the press, by politicians, and by the
American people over the use of American troops in Russia
also weighed on Wilson. The public could not understand why
Americans were fighting now that the war had ended and the
threat of German expansion was eliminated. Wilson was also
becoming more preoccupied with the peace settlement and
mission's original purpose to guard military stores had been
- -achie3.Le.d...(_even as the Allies had become engaged in fighting
~------------------
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the Bolsheviks. In June 1919, the 339th Infantry regiment
was withdrawn from Northern Russia, having sustained five
hundred casualties. American intervention in Russia,
however, did not end on this date. American troops were
still engaged in Siberia, where they were not withdrawn
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until April 1920. 88
u.s. Casualties in Northern Russia (514)
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With the end of-the American intervention in Northern
Russia, many Americans asked: "Why had we gone to Russia?"
What wen~ wrong in the Northern Russian campaign? The
operation was a failure from a military and political point
of view. Soon after the Americans had left North Russia,
the French and British withdrew as well. They only lasted a
few months moreT'~1mtil October 12, 1919. The Allies left
behind an anti-Bolshevik government in the North that could
not defend itself. Theci ty of Archangel fell to the.
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Communists in February 1920. It seemed that the Allies lost
the initiative, after the early gains of the intervention,
when General Poole had pushed toward the interior. The
Allies had bogged down when winter arrived, and Bolshevik
counte;~tta~s had increased. Without the political'will or
popular support to commit reinforcements to Northern Russia,
the Allied position deteriorated quickly. The Allies faced
serious problems from friction among the troops of differing
nationality over command during the winter. On one hand,
friction arose between the Allied armies; on the other, open
dis~ontent spread among the soldiers over the conditions of
the intervention and led eventually to several mutinies in
the French, Russia, British, and even American units in
Northern Russia. What brought about this friction between
the American and British units over command structure and
led to a mutiny by an American company? By looking at
"different military traditions, cultural differences among
the allies (British particularly), cultural snobbery,
diversity of the troops in the intervention, and differing
h. ~poli tical a~ms of .""the allies, the answers to American-
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discontent not just about commana structure, but also
American lack of understanding why they were still in
Northern Russia after the war had ended, may be brought to
light. /
The British contingent consisted of an infantry brigade
numbering nearly 4,500 men. The brigade was made up
primarily of Royal Scots and British soldiers. Two groups
of British officers commanded. One group consisted of
officers who had seen combat on the Western Front and were
in North Russia because they were professional military men
or loved adventure. The other group was made up of officers
who had not seen combat and viewed the North Russian
operation as anopportun{E~-io advance their careers by
making a name for themselves. After all, by 1918 the war
appeared to be coming to an end; thus the Russian campaign
might be the last chance to gain a reputation in combat. It
was this last group of British of~icers against whom the
Americans complained when -abuses of command were mentioned. 89
The quality of British officers may have ,been the most
satisfac-tory for conducting the war; neither were British
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combat troops used in Northern Russia first rate. Most of
General Poole's and General Ironside's British troops
serving in 191 C3.
/
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This meant that the British soldiers were unfit for arduous
duty in the field, but could be assigned for garrison or
guard duty. They were not for use in a combat role. At
this time, Britain faced a manpower shortage because of its
vast commitments in Europe and in other theaters of the war.
For the British intervention in Northern Russia, troops of
category C3 were used in combat roles. They were used in
combat and also kept on the front line for long periods of
time.
The Frenth faced th~ same manpower problems that the
British were facing in 1918. The French never really
interested in Northern Russia and only sent a token force of
approximately 370 officers and men of the 21st Colonial
Infantry Battalion. 90
Due to British manpower shortages a Canadian units were
~ -.
employed in Northern Russla"- The 16th Brigade Field_
The Canadian unit also severed to supplement the American
units being sent to Russia. The American army lacked
sufficient artillery and machiBe guns to support its
jnfantry and relied upon European manufacturers for these
items. For example to show how lacking the United states
war industry was, American fliers throughout the war flew in
British and French planes. The Brigade had 497, most of
whom seen service in France. 91
The Allied forces not British, French or American
included 360 Serbs, 1,109 Italians, 309 Poles, and 226
Chinese. 92 The Allied commitment to Northern Russia included
one brigade of British infantry, one regiment of American
infantry, one battalion of FrenCh infantry, two sections of
French artillery and machine-guns, one brigade of Canadian
artillery for a total of about 9,500 front line troops.93
The total Allied forces in the Archangel area was 909
officers and 13,471 men. 94
Thedive~se backgrounds of soldiers from.so many
different countries were bound to strain any military
c.ommand structure in which one group dominated. That role
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fell to the British, who had a totally different command
structure from that of the Americans. The difference was
bound to cause friction between the . ish
troops.
Allied Unit Strengths on the Archangel Front
British
American
Russian
French
o 2000 4000 6000
Source: NARS/M924 Section 23-10 ..5 U.S. and Allied Strength.
Complaints about the British and their command abuses
began almost from the start. Why did American and British
troops dislike each other so much? Our view of the British
today is that of a constant ally. If one were to ask the
question today: Who is America's best friend in the world,
··the ·answer most 'Americans would give would be Great Britain·.
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The answer why the Americ~ns and British disliked one
another at the time of the Russian intervention must be
sought in the history of Anglo-American relations. During
the early part of the twentieth century, Great Britain was
still seen as the most powerful country ~n the world. Much
like "America today, England was resented and hated by many
in the world, although for different reasons. Americans at
that time were like people in the world today who dislike
and envy the United states for being so powerful and
prosperous. Thus the resentment held by the American
soldiers was only natural for that period.
Another reason which may have caused resentment was the
long history of Anglo-American antagonism. The American
Revolution and the War of 1812 had been bitter conflicts
with Britain. America during the early twentieth century
was seeking to establish its place in the world and was
eager to be recognized as a Great Power. The United States
had come recently to this role and was not yet fully
accepted by the other powers. The British, along with the
other European powers, ~ere unwilling, to some extent, __ .t9._
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recognize America as a Great Power, let alone an equal,
aggravating strains between the two countries. A rivalry
endeavors like the amount of warships each country
possessed, scientific discoveries, and in cultural pursuits .
.~.
Some British still saw Americans as being children who had
rebelled against their parents and would be better off
returning to British control. This was a time of cultural
snobbery in Western societies and eugenics was taken as
scientific fact.
The British view of American society involved a similar
misconception, that America was a land of Indians and
gunslingers. The British saw America in these terms, not as
an equal in culture and power. Americans were suspicious of
British colonial interests in the Western Hemisphere,
bringing jealous feelings to the surface. British naval
seizure of American f.1eutral shipping before America entered
the war was still seen as an outrage reminiscent" ()"f.BF~.~ish
impressment of American sailors before the War of 1812.
America and Britain were all~~d_.::i.uJ:'ing this period, but this
"'-. '<." ";_.,,,._,~,- .., •• ~.-.-.--. -, .-• .I''''''~'''--
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does not mean that both countries trusted one another or had
forgotten old past aggressions. They were two Great Powers,
still rivals both polit~cally and economically.
The British and French also saw the Americans as
latecomers to the war in Europe. They believed, with some
truth, that they had defeated Germany on their own and the
)-.
Americans had come at the end of the fighting. ' They
resented the way Americans boasted how they would win the
war and later after the war was over how they had won it. A
favorite America song of the era, Over There, boasted how
the Americans were not coming back from Europe until the war
was over. 95
Another question which must be answered is: Why did
America and British soldiers quarrel in Northern Russia?
This question is partially answered by the paragraphs above;
yet there is more to the whole story of American dislike for
their British Allies.
British military practices and traditions in Northern
_ ' '-_.#
Russia offended their American allies~ One such practice
was the use of alcohol by British officers.
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The British
Army had a tradition of giving its soldiers ·a "tot," that
is, a ration of rum or whiskey. This practice had a long
Napoleonic Wars and before. The American Army did not have
I
this tradition and, in fact, banned the issuing of an
alcoholic ration and the use of spirts while on duty in
1830. 96 By 1865 the U. S. Army was no longer providing
alcohol to its soldiers 'through its commissaries at military
installations. 97 At this time, America was in a temperance
~~----~~~~~~
phase which saw alcohol as a social evil and eventually led
to Prohibition being enacted in 1920. The average soldier
may not cared if he got alcohol and might in fact have
welcomed it as a relief from the boredom; but some officers,
the Y.M.C.A., and the American Red Cross did object. Most
of the officers came from middle to upper class families who
were probably active in the movement to ban alcohol, while
the American Red Cross and the Y.M.C.A looked upon alcohol
as a social menace. C.T. Williams of the American Red Cross
in Northern Russia complained: "Large quantities of liquor
-hcfs resulted' in excessive- drinking among English officers
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Jbut not among the English soldiers and very little among the
American o!~i~_erJ'>,_and not at all so far as was observed,
1--------------
among the American soldiers. ,,98
The issue of British abuse of command hierarchy during
the intervention was the biggest complaint Americans made
against the British. This issue was so troublesome that
American soldiers believed that British officers and NCOs
carried around higher insignia so they could falsify rank to
"
command American officers in the field. E.M. Halliday
summed up this feeling well: "It was the confirmed belief
of many American officers that British headquarters handed
out temporary promotions with abandon in order to ensure
that Americans would always be outranked on every front in
every village. ,,99
An unidentified sergeant from Company K of the 339th,
".
who was on the Dvina front, was thoroughly disgusted with
the British. He vented his feelings in this statement:
"I've always said about the British, if there was a war
against them, I'd be there tomorrow to fight them. They
-treated us- like dogs, stayed way behind us and,made ,us dQ
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-all the fighting. We were issued sheepskin coats and
sleeping bags, but the British took them away from us after
r-------~::_e;rr_da~~:tftcl--fu:ffi(~Q-til..em Oll t to the i r own men. From then on
we had only our overcoats to wear. "100
Another unidentified sergeant from Company M, who was
stationed on the Railway Front, remembered how he had to pay
an additional fee for a pair of ice skates donated in
America. All Allied supplies and materials were distributed
by the British. He also remembered a time when his squad
was on guard duty and sighted some Bolshevik forces in the
distance. The sergeant wrote: "A British sergeant in
charge of a barricade about one hundred yards away walked
over to me and demanded, 'Sergeant, why didn't you open
fire?' I grabbed my pistol and told him, 'Get the hell
back to your barricade! I'm in charge here, not you. ' " 101
Captain H.S. Martin, in a report to Colonel J. A.
Ruggles, Chief of the American Military Mission, described
the poor.American morale. His report revealed substantial
discontent with the British. While he was visiting the
..
.Dvina Front, he heard particularly harsh condeItthations of
,.. . ,-" -
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the British allies. Martin learned through soldiers serving
with 2nd Lieutenant Calhoon that he upon reading a local
English-language newspaper, became aagery about Caucasian
o lcers placed on trlaI for taklng four million roubles
from the Bolsheviks when they evacuated Archangel. Calhoon
was heard to say of this newspaper account: "This is the
biggest steal the British Government has ever pulled off. I
know the inside history of this affair and I know that the
Br i t i sh were behind it." 102
On another occasion, in the presence of several other
American soldiers, he repeated his charges: "England stole
those four million roubles and applied them to the debt
which Russia owes to her. She is now fighting the
Bolsheviks in the hope of collecting the balance." Nor was
this the end of Calhoon's complaints. He went on to say:
"When I go back to America I'm going to tell the people how
the money of the American Red Cross has been spent in Russia
to publish a newspaper for the purpose of trying to uphold
the morale of the American troops so that they will continue
to fight for England. "103
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Captain Martin encountered another expressions of
~
discontent on the Dvina about the British from a Captain
l-- ----''-H~ of Company c. Captain Cheery made the following
statement about the use of American troops by the British.
He declared: "America troops in Russia had been loaned to
the British Government for a certain period of time and that
their service would expire on the 17th of May. "104
Charles B. Ryan, a lieutenant in K Company serving on
the Dvina front, made his distaste for the British and the
intervention known in his diary and letters. In one letter
. .
entitled "Somewhere in Russia," he wrote on November 17,
1918: "I sure wish that I had been sent to France, instead
of up here. This is a British Expedition, you know your
history. "105 Ryan wro.te in his diary on October 27, 1918
about the British: "Got into Emetskoe [on the Dvina River]
about 7:30 P.M. This perfect madhouse, guess they are all
drunk. The officers are to sleep at lodges upstairs, a
-- British C6l0fiel,informed us that as they only had chairs
and utensils enough for themselves ... They are a typical
British outJi.t.r. pigheaded .§:nd st~pid ... This is 99i119 . .right
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up. We are sore, and tell the world what we are told .
. .. Ended up going to the American Y.M.C.A." 106
These manifestations of discontent on the Dvina came
not only from personal statements by American soldiers, but
also founq expression in a written list of grievances.
Colonel J. A. Ruggles, Military Attache to the\Chief of
•American Military Mission, came across a widely circulated
paper produced by American troops on the Dvina front listing
thirteen reasons why American troops were serving in Russia.
He sent the paper to Colonel stewart on February 27, 1919.
A personal note to stewart frc5in"Ruggles read: II I am sending
this informally for your information.
FACTS AND QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE N. R. E. F.
1. We officers enlisted and our men were drafted for
the purpose of fighting Germany and her Alli~s.
2. This force was sent to Russia to prevent Ge~many
f~m-establishing navel bases in the far North.
3. The American organisations [sic] have been split up
and placed under British officers. England has
undoubtedly many capable officers, but they are not in
Russia. However we ourselves, are woefully lacking in
that respect. The manner in which this expedition has
been mishandled is a disgrace to the civilized wqrld.
4. Our original purpose having been accomplished we
are now meddling with a Russian revolution and
counter-revolution.
S. Is this consistent with the principles of American
democracy?
6 . _The majority of.thepeople here seem"toprefer._
.----- ------BoJ.shevism to Bri ti-sh -interv-ention.~ __ They mistrust -the
British. It'is our opinion .that British diplomats
pulled the wool over our eyes of our representatives,
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to the end that we were sent with this expedition in
an effert [sic] to take the curse off the British.
7. The few French here finally rebelled against
British rule and have been given a French commander.
8. WHERE IS OUR MONROE DOCTRINE?
r----O..------ --l~ we--9tQQci idly by, while Mexico was torn by
revolutions, the sanctify oIOur--b-oL'ders-vi-o-l-a-t-ed-ami----
Americans murdered, on what basis is our presence here
justified? A British officer here, who is more human
than most, quite aptly described'this expedition as an
effert [sic] to put on a show with two men and an
orange.
9. We are fighting against enormous odds in men,
artillery and material. Most of the men in the enemy
forces have seen years of service. If they were not
lacking in morale and discipline, we should have been
wiped off the face of the earth ere[sic]this.
10. Due to a pending election in England, and the fear
of antagonizing the labor parties, no reenforcements
[sic] have been sent out. In fact before the election,
certain British officials placed themselves on record
'as having no intentions of sending more troops to
Russia.
11. We wonder what propagander[sic] is at work in the
states, which enables the War Department to keep troops
here. It seems to use as though it is a question of
potential dollars in Russia.
12. We, a portion of the civilian army of America,
organized to fight Germany, wonder why we are called
upon to spend American lives aiding and abetting °a
counter-revolution in Russia while th~/ great majority
of the people here sit idly by watching the snow, not
idly either, for the most of the natives here are
Bolshevists [sic] in sympathy. We have no heart in the
fought. We are fighting neither for Russia or for
Russian wealth but for our lives. We have earnestly
endeavored to find some justification for our being
here, but have been unable to reconcile this expedition
with American ideals ano principles instilled within
us.
13. We are removed 200 miles from our base, with an
open country intervening, with no force except in a few
villages to guard our lines- 'and'-with the enemy within
striking distance of the line. There is no military
reason why we should be more than 20 miles from our
base. ,,107
"
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It may seem from these statements by America soldiers
in Northern Russia that the British were greatly resented.
The bitterness pointed particularly at the British officer
corps. But was the anger to~ards the British generally
shared by all American soldiers? It seems that it was not
universal, but instead came from a few disgruntled NCOs and
junior officers.
What was the source of the bitter feelings towards the
British among the NCOs and junior American officers? One
answer may come from the lack of training and
professionalism in the American Army at this time.
America's wartime army was a conscript one, which had led to
lowering the standards for both troops and officers to meet
manpower requirements. This lack of training 'and military
professionalism did not go unno'ticed by American and British
officers in Northern Russia. General Ironside, the British
commander who took over for General Poole during the winter
of 1918-1919, said of the American troops: "[':I'0~YL.wereof
fine physique, but they had no' experience of war and when
they arrived· their- m'ilitary training. was most imperfect. "lOB
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An observer for the Royal Flying Corps, 2nd Lieutenant
Shrive, had this to say about the American troops that he
\
n on the Vaga Front: "The Americans are green
troops with no previous experience. ,,109 British Brigadier
General Graham, who was serving with the British forces in
North Russia said of the Americans: "Your officers are to
blame. They won't be taught; they are too stubborn."lIo
The American War Office was aware that the American
forces in North Russia were deficient both in the art of war
and in combat experience. The War Office was informed of
these deficiencies in an operations report stating:
"Infantry have only two regular officers ... one being the
colonel. Remainder of officers National Army who arrived
here with scarcely any training at all." The report
continues about American officers, citing: "3 or 4 cases of
captains of the American troops being found incapable of
conunanding even an isolated company. "ill The conunanding
officer, Colonel Stewart, was not a West Point graduate;
instead he rose from the ranks to become an officer. It was
a rare occurrence in the American military for an enlisted -
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man to rise from the ranks. Colonel Stewart was a temporary
f-:-,-,---=----.----~3Bc±-Er.Re±__wfiH~_s_eT_V_::i·~ i n NO~""""-W.J.L:l..:LJ.-<;L..-9a~n,-,:d~w~a~s~l~a~t::..:e::.:r'=- J
elevated to the r.ank of lieutenant colonel in 1922. 112
Another reason for American dislike of the British can
be found among certain officers and NCOs who had to serve in
similar circumstances. The area with the most complaints by
officers and NCOs about the British was the Dvina Front.
Here Calhoon and others allowed their dislike for the
British to be widely known. But dislike for the British
appeared in other fronts of Northern Russian as well, for
example the Railway Front. These two areas, fronts which
saw minimal fighting, required mostly fatigue work and
patrols. These circumstances left much idle time and
allowed boredom to spread. Calhoon, and others who held
these opinions toward the British, could have been venting
their boredom and disappointment with their situation in
their complaints .
. Captain 'H." s·~· 'Martin, in a report on moral -on'duly--l,
1919, wrote to Colonel J. A. Ruggles, Chief American
Military Mission, offfle Dvina front: "I heard nothing but
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condemnation of Companies D, B, and C, 339th Infantry, which
{
were then serving on the Dvina, I visited Kurgomin and saw a
good deal of the officers and men of Company D, I have never
come into contact with a more disgruntled, discouraging set
than I found in the officers of the company."1l3
The front which saw the most fighting was the Vaga
River. Here the Allies suffered their worst setback when
they had to retreat from Shenkursk during the winter of
1918-1919. Were there any complaints about British command
here? According to Captain Martin's report, he fo~nd that
on the Vaga front: "the morale of our troops to be much
better ... he [Captain Ra~say, commander of Company F] never
spoke disparagingly of the British to me ... "114 Captain
Martin wrote in his report about the 310th Engineers who
were based in Archangel and had performed tasks on every
front: "In speaking of low American morale I want to say
again' that I do not in any case refer to the American
engin.eer;s.# .. Theywere praised on all sides and were in good
spirits and doing good work wherever they were found."
Martin went on to say in his report about theengThee-rs':" "I
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attribute this to two causes: .First, they had excellent
officers; secondly, they were always kept busy."115 General
Richard, inspecting American soldiers in Northern Russia,
I---."c;:-...--~----;r:ktT-~rft-l< __-fTf-tfhH'e>----'l!vcf-.Ta>rg~a-ff'-rLIOllITlrL:.--<''1)'WliltTlI;-'Tlpe-c:s;ro)rmiile:;-ssm~aII'I{c:;-;o;:Ymmnp:TI;;ailirnl1tFs~-----
were submitted to me, as their 'own General,' there was
nothing of serious nature, and many spoke in terms of praise
of the British officers placed over them, especially of
those in high command." 116
If.American soldiers on the Vaga front had no
substantial complaints about the British and got on
reasonably well with them, tile other fronts were centers of
discontent. Was this discontent with the British on the
other fronts universal? Probably so, because a few
Americans, like Calhoon, were openly voicing their
discontent over the situation they found themselves in
Northern Russia. The complaints and discontent of the
Americans became more vocal after the armistice was signed
in November 1918. Under the terms of Wilson's aide-memoire
~fhe American mission to Russia was completed and they
believed- they had a right to go horne or at least be given a
.-"" -- - "-' ..-.- ',..-;-_." .__..• - - ••--- - - =..-
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clear reason why they were in Russia. The Americans were
not alone in causing the friction between the two Allies.
and men was not excellent.
American soldiers on other fronts experienced boredom
and fatigue. When they complained about the BFitish, they
were most likely voicing discontent over these experiences.
Another factor was that by now the American war in Europe
had been over for months and these men were most anxious to
go horne. The desire to return horne was constant among
Allied soldiers in Northern Russia after the war ended.
= J
The wish to go horne and frustration with the tour of
duty in Russia appear in many letters and diaries. Sergeant
John Crissman of Company A on the Vaga front made his
feelings about Northern Russia plain in his diary. Crissman
was at first eager for action, as his diary entry for
September 21, 1918 indicates: "All feeling fine and raring
lengthened, his attitude changed. On October 19th Crissman
_, ._. -wrote: "Everybody happy for a while. Rece-ived'news that
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Germany was asking for peace terms." The next day he wrote
in his diary, "Word received that revolution was taking
place in Germany. Everybody sees possibility of leaving
here in Spring for states." His next entry shows how even
little things could brighten a soldier's day. On October
21st Crissman wrote: "Received our first mail today. Life
looks brighter now." A few days after the Armistice,
Crissman recalled in his diary, "One year ago today I went
to Camp Custer. It seems like ten years. "117
Discontent over British command or over the continuing
-intervention in Northern Russia by the Allies was not
limited to open condemnation of the British, but expressed
itself in several mutinies during the winter and spring of
1919. Every allied contingent was faced with one or more
mutinies; even the American regiment faced a mutiny in the
ranks.
The American mutiny occurred on March 30, 1919,
involving company-I ~of~ the 33~9th Infantry Regiment., ~ ~
cOIlUll,anded by Captain Horatio Winslow, at Archangel. IIB
Company I was ordered. out early in the- morning on March 30
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to load sleighs and prepare to depart from Archangel to
prQceed to the Railway front. Upon hearing that they were
r----------£hipping ont to the front, the men of I Company stopped
loading and refused to work any more. Sergeant McGuire, in
charge of loading, reported to the officer on duty that the
men had refused to load the sleds and stopped working. When
the officer arrived and ordered the men to resume to work,
the men only started working again sloW~y. One man refused
to obey and continued to stand idle. The officer talked to
the man directly, but he continued to disobey the order to
load the sleighs. The man was arrested and taken to the
guard house. By this time Colonel Stewart had been alerted
to the situation and came down to address the problem
himself. The men were assembled by the Colonel in the local
Y.M.C.A. were he gave them a long talk. l19
During this discussion with Stewart the soldiers
directed several questions to the Colonel and the company's
officers. . PI. relYOrtfrorrr-Capta-inJa<::ob A.Harzfeld- to-
Colonel J. A. Ru~gles, Chief of American Military Mission,
.• _0_ . ~:~A,rct:a.ng_e~., re~orcls. ":Jha.t:th~se questions were. The soldiers
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asked: "Why are we fighting in Russia? We were sent here
to guard supplies; why are ~e sent to the front now that the
war on the Western front has ceased? "120 Even after this the
solaiers still refused to move'off to the front until the
man who refused to obey the orders was released from the
stockade. He was released by Colonel Stewart and Company I
proceeded onto the front. 121
Company I's mutiny was a direct symptom of the American
discontent and dislike for British command of the
intervention. The mutiny was reported in the United States
on April 10, 1919. The Detroit Free Press ran a head line
reading "Mutiny Spirit Fills Entente Russia Force,"
describing the events of the mutiny. The paper on April 13,
1919 ran a story on the Chief of Staffs' view of the mutiny.
General P.C. Marsh, Chief of Staff, said in the article:
"In all my career this is the first instance of an American
soldier refusing to fight. "122
The~·peopl-e-of Detroit, especially -rel-ati.vesbf-the men,'
now clamored for the 339th Regiment to corne horne. On April
-:LO, the--Detroit.Free Press ran an-article-entitled "Return
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339th, Detroit's Plea" just three days before the official
report of the mutiny was reported by the government. A
1- ~:;aB±egram ,was sent to vhlson in ,flaris by the "Detroit's Own
Welfare Association" which was concerned to bring American
soldiers home from Russia as soon as possible. The same
group also sent a telegram to General P. C. March, chief of
staff in Washington D.C., calling for an immediate American
withdrawal. When the mutiny was reported in Detroit, the
organization, numbering 200,000, sent a telegram to Provost
Marshal Enoch Crowder indicating its members WQuIa.:
"Seriously resent any harsh punishment being meted out to
the rebellious troops. "123 They went on to say of the
intervention that it was already unpopular and that the
troops should be withdrawn at once. 124 j"Y
The mutiny did not escape Congress. The Congress had
been getting ready before the mutiny to inquire into the
presence of American troops in Russia. Led by Congressman
. Hir,am··Johnson..ofCalifornia, _,the House planned to
investigate the situation in Northern Russia. The questions
the Congress wa~<~iIlterested in asking were: "Why were they
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sent to Russia? Who sent them? Who commands them?125
Public and Congressional concern over the presence of
'American troops in Russia, and then the mutiny Company I,
all brought home the need to withdraw the American troops.
The battle of Shenkursk had brought the decision by Wilson
to remove the American forces in June 1919. The mutiny
forced Wilson to realize that his aide-memoire had been
violated and that America had been drawn into a war that
neither he nor the public wanted.
Coalition warfare ended in failure both politically and
militarily for the Allies. The Allies did not overthrow the
Bolsheviks, reestablish the Eastern Front (although this did
not matter after the 'armistice had been signed), or link up
with the Czech Legion. The Allies left a shaky
anti-Bolshevik government in Northern Russia that was soon
overrun by the Bolsheviks in the fall of 1919. There are
some valuable lessons to be learned from the American
intervention in Northern Russia. When so many d~fferent
forces were combined unde~ a single command, in this case
British, there was almost_certain to be friction ..among the ..
... .. _... _. __ ., .. ' .. __·c7 9 ..... ,.
(
Allies. Much more recently, this phenomenon can be seen in
the Gulf War, when the French were willing to participate in
anyone other than their own generals. The lesson is that
different nations have different command structures and
traditions, and these mu~t be taken into account. For
example, during the Northern Russian int~rvention it was
acceptable for British soldiers to receive an alcohol
ration; but when the British started giving one to the
Americans, friction resulted.
A second lesson is that eaoh nation cannot insure equal
quality in its soldiers. While British officers and men had
seen more action in war and many were seasoned veterans, the
same could not be said of their American counterparts.
Different degrees of training and combat experience will
cause friction among soldiers. United Nations operations in
the future will have to deal with this in even greater
degree, as-technology accelerateS-.-di~f~ferencesamong
countries.
A third and final lesson pertains to Allied strategy in
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Northern Russia. Much of the soldiers' discontent arose
from important differences in the .purpose of their mission.
The Americans were sent by President Wilson to guard
supplies, yet ended up in combat, or close to it. Once in
combat the Americans were asked to complete an impossible
mission. The overall Allied strategy was too broad and was
not agreed to by all the governments. General Poole's belief
that he could push his way to Moscow hardly conformed to the
policy aims of Britain's allies (France and the United
states in the intervention).
The American intervention in Russia was a failure for
many reasons. The one most pronounced on the military side
was American discontent with the British and particularly
the manner in which British officers were viewed and held
command. ~he political failure came from the differing
hllied agendas for Russia. France and Britain both feared
Bolshevism and its spread in Eastern Europe. While the two
countries could agree on the~hreat posed by Bolshevism,
they differed in how to achieve the goal of stopping/
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along with the creation of the states Poland and Romania to
check the future aggression of Germany. Britain wanted
border states around Russia to cre~te a cordon sanitaire to
prevent German and Russia aggression. American policy in
the intervention was certainly anti-Bolshevik. Wilson had
nothing but contempt for Communism, yet he had to abide the
by self determination of the Russia people. He believed
that the Russian people would eventually grow tired of
Bolshevik rule and overthrow it. American official policy
was stated for the American intervention in Wilson's
aide-memoire. The aide-memoire was not followed by the
American forces in Russia.
When the armistice was signed by Germany in November
1918, the American position in Russia, at least to the
American soldiers, became untenable. But before the
armistice, problems among the American soldiers had already
surfaced. The soldiers did not like their British allies
and the authority British officers apd noncommissioned
officers had over American troops. The friction between the
two Allies hind~-fed operations in Northern- Russia:~- leading
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to the withdrawal of American forces from Northern Russia
;1
and contributing to the failure of the anti-Bolshevik
campaign of the first postwar months.
\
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